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Background
Recent events have highlighted one of the intrinsic
weaknesses of computerised information resources:
the attractions of storing more and more information
in one place creates a higher risk of that information
being improperly accessed.Copying largedatabases onto
laptops and optical media makes them readily trans-
portable, but also easily lost or stolen. Reports have
catalogued numerous losses in theUKof government-
held conﬁdential and often personal information,1–3
and there is evidence that public conﬁdence is being
eroded.4
It seems unlikely that the losses that have been
declared give the full picture. Undoubtedly far more
personal information has been improperly accessed
and disclosed through authorised system users abusing
their privileges – a largely unreported and unmonitored
activity. Although it is notoriously hard to obtain
ﬁgures relating to such losses occurring ‘behind closed
doors’, a report by New Zealand’s NSW Independent
Commission against Corruption in 1992 on the
unauthorised disclosure of government information
stated: ‘This investigation has disclosed a massive illicit
trade in government information. That trade has been
conducted with apparent disregard for privacy con-
siderations, and a disturbing indiﬀerence to concepts
of integrity and propriety.’5
A similar report from the UK Information Commis-
sioner in 2006 conﬁrmed that this trade has gone from
strength to strength as the number, size and ‘value’ of
these databases in public and private ownership has
increased.6
Improper disclosure of some conﬁdential informa-
tion such as personal banking details and passwords
can normally be remedied with little more than temp-
orary problems – account details can be changed and
ﬁnancial restitutionmade, thereby restoring the status
quo. But with other types of personal data, such as
biometric and health information, no remedy is
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possible as the information is ‘permanent’ and part of
the person: once such information has been made
known outside the environment in and for which it was
provided in conﬁdence, that information cannot sub-
sequently bemade secret again. Remedies provided for
in law cannot change the fact of the disclosure, and
may prove completely worthless to the subject.
Personal health information
All users of personalised information resources poten-
tially threatenprivacy. Primaryusers (thosewhose access
is based on a duty of care) may exceed their author-
isation and access and disclose records for patients
when they have no duty of care or need to know.
Secondary users (those generating analyses, research
reports and ﬁnancial management data) may be passed
datasets containing patient identiﬁers which are not
required for their work, therefore breaching the patients’
right to privacy.
Primary uses
When patients consult a care provider, they do so with
the expectation that their problem will be discussed in
private and that the data shared between the two will
be only that required for diagnosis and treatment, and
for billing; and that providers will keep their own
notes/records of each encounter. From the perspective
of the patient that is, in a nutshell, the essence of the
transaction as regards information. There is no doubt
that having timely access to comprehensive health
information about an individual can greatly facilitate
his or her care, as well as reducing risks and costs.
Some methods for sharing patient data between care
providers have been developed but are limited by the
diversity of point-of-care systems, data classiﬁcation
and coding methods, standards and communications
between systems. Whilst there is a clear argument that
greater sharing of data between professionals directly
involved in the care of the patient is in his or her best
clinical interests, there is an equally clear countervailing
argument that sharing all or part of their personal
record may not be acceptable to the patient, and the
law supports this latter viewpoint.
Secondary uses
Secondary uses include a range of business, ﬁnancial,
quality assurance, audit, research, public health and
marketing activities:7 as these fall outside the explicit
reasons for which the data was gathered, their disclos-
ure should be subject to legal requirement for the
informed consent of the patient. There are exceptions
to this: the consent of the patient to limited secondary
usage of their data may be given in the context, for
example, of health insurance contracts where the con-
tract can only be fulﬁlled if data is shared with the
insurer; and patient consent is not required in relation
to statutory instruments relating to public interest
(e.g. in the context of notiﬁable communicable dis-
eases). Of course the situation is diﬀerent where the
identity of the patient is removed from the data in such
a way that re-identiﬁcation of the individual becomes
practically impossible.
Ethics, the law and privacy of
health information
From an ethical standpoint, patient conﬁdentiality is a
long-established principle of health professional prac-
tice. Certainly all professional medical associations
require their members to show respect for personal
information and to keep it private and conﬁdential –
generally with severe penalties for improper disclosure.
In terms of the law, there are two key bodies of
applicable legislation.One is theDirective 95/46/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 which addresses the protection of indi-
viduals with regard to the processing of personal data.8
The object of the 1995 directive is plainly stated in
paragraph 1: ‘to protect the fundamental rights and
freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their
right toprivacywith respect to theprocessingofpersonal
data’.
There follows a deﬁnition of ‘personal data’:
any information relating to an identiﬁed or identiﬁable
natural person (‘data subject’); an identiﬁable person is
one who can be identiﬁed, directly or indirectly, in par-
ticular by reference to an identiﬁcation number or to one
or more factors speciﬁc to his physical, physiological,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity.
Clearly this includes all forms of personal health records
and information, even where personal identiﬁers have
been removed or encrypted but there remains suf-
ﬁcient data for the individual to be re-identiﬁed.
The other relevant legislation is the European
Convention on Human Rights enacted in the UK in
1998.9 Article 8 states that:
1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
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2 There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.
This is backed up by article 13, which provides that:
‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in
this Convention are violated shall have an eﬀective
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding
that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an oﬃcial capacity’.
A recent case (20511/03) in the European Court of
HumanRights has upheld this right to privacy, ﬁnding
in favourof aFinnishnationalwhosepersonalisedhealth
data, including her positive HIV status, had been im-
properly accessed by colleagues who had no duty of
care towards her.
Further UK legislation enacted in 2002, the Health
Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations,
permits the Health Secretary to exert eﬀective control
over all UK health information, including personal
data.10 This act states in section 7 that those engaged
in secondary uses of these data must; ‘so far as it is
practical to do so, remove from the information any
particulars which identify the person to whom it relates
which are not required for the purposes for which it is,
or is to be, processed’.
In other words if there are alternative ways of
achieving the stated aims without infringing personal
privacy and conﬁdentiality, these must be adopted.
The EU Privacy Directive permits secondary uses of
personal data (article 7) where ‘processing is necessary’
in order to fulﬁl contractual arrangements and other
statutory and legal obligations, but explicitly notes
that the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data
subjectmust be respected and preserved, so re-enforcing
the provisions of the Human Rights Act. The Health
Service Regulations of 2002 are subordinate to the
requirements of EU-derived legislation where any
conﬂicts may arise.
Ultimately personal medical records are conﬁdential
to the patient, whose express consent must be obtained
before they can be shared whilst still personalised
(unless one of the legal exemptions applies). Arguments
based around an ‘implied consent’ model will always
be mired in controversy and legal dispute: too much
depends on who makes the implication and on what
basis.
Parameters of a sustainable
solution
Principles
There are four principles that should be applied in this
domain.
1 The patient should control who may see what of
their records – they require a means to exert this
control. Where the patient cannot participate (e.g.
when unconscious) a means must be provided to
by-pass this requirement, subject to audit.
The NHS Connecting for Health project
The current stated aim of the NHS connectivity
(Connecting for Health) project is to store relevant
clinical information about every patient and to
make it available to care service providers as,
when and wherever required and also for sec-
ondary uses. Given adequate attention to security
planning and implementation, there is no theor-
etical reasonwhy the proposed system should not
function as planned and comply with the law.
The practical reality, however, is diﬀerent: regard-
less of howwell planned, implemented andmain-
tained, history indicates that systems security will
be breached, most often by authorised users abus-
ing their privileges. Such an integrated store of
clinical information would clearly create an at-
tractive target for abuse, and its attraction would
only increase with the quantity and quality of data
stored within it. In practice the security frame-
work seems less than adequately planned. In an
informative review, Ross Anderson highlights
some of the weaknesses:11 in particular he raises
serious concerns as tohow the access controlwould
function, and how it would embrace patients’
rights to exercise control over their own data. It is
already possible for the police, revenue, welfare and
security services to access (behind government
closed doors) many aspects of our private lives
recorded in publicly held databases: the likeli-
hood that the NHS conﬁdential patient infor-
mation resource would be similarly accessed is
little short of a certainty, whatever assurances
may be publicly provided.
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2 There are few secondary data uses where the ident-
ity of the patient should accompany the data, and
the principle of minimal disclosure should be ap-
plied to data sets provided for analysis.
3 Where personal data is required for an approved
(but not directly care related) purpose, the per-
mission of the patient should be sought, and where
this is given the data disclosed should comply with
the principle of theminimal disclosure necessary to
meet the stated needs. If refused, the data should be
withheld, except where there is an overwhelming
issue of risk/harm involving third parties or the
public at large.
4 The system of consent/permissions should, at its
simplest, be readily managed by both patients and
professionals.
For secondary usage, the aimmust be to enable the goals
to be achieved without compromising personal priv-
acy. Although most do not require the patient to be
personally identiﬁed, for some studies it may be
important to have certain derived data (e.g. sex, age
range, area of domicile, etc.); and for other studies it
may be necessary to follow the progress of a speciﬁc
individual through the care system, but again the actual
identity of that individual is unimportant. Simply
providing access to the full personalised data for these
purposes sits uncomfortably with the law and even less
comfortably with ethical imperatives.
Context and content
If conceptually one separates the record relating
to each healthcare event/encounter into CONTEXT
(who, when, where) and CONTENT (what), it is clear
that the bulk of the data is content, but what makes it
personal and meaningful is the context. Even given
knowledge of an individual (such as illnesses and pat-
terns of care encounters) and ready access to content-
only records it is highly unlikely that records could be
deﬁnitely matched to that individual without any
contextual tags.
Context
There are numerous attributes of the medical record
that must be considered as ‘context’ and which may
enable a record to be linked to an identiﬁable individ-
ual. All these canbe removed from the recordof care and
kept separately, replaced by tokens representing the
patient and the provider/institution. Where research
and analysis requires some personal context, suitable
abstracts and derivatives from these context data can
be provided to meet the speciﬁc purposes. There is an
excellent review of this issue where 18 categories of
contextual data which can be used in identifying an
individual are listed.12 A synopsis of these categories,
condensed into six general groups, follows:
1 All names (and aliases).
2 All biometric identiﬁers, including images.
3 All dates (birth, event/encounter, death etc.).
4 All geographic identiﬁers (e.g. addresses, post codes)
which embrace less than 20 000 people.
5 All contact numbers, emails, internet protocol ad-
dresses etc.
6 All alternate identiﬁers, registrations and enrol-
ments relating to administrative functions, insurance
plans, vehicles, other.
Content
Separation from the context leaves content of greatly
reduced sensitivity. To reconstruct the full care record
for continuing patient care (with any omissions deemed
important by the patient) requires that the patient has
some means to link together context and content and
so authorise the care provider to view their stored
records. The provider may then store whatever they
need of that on their own system for medico-legal and
audit purposes: further they may be provided with a
limited duration token which enables them to access
future patient progress information (e.g. after referral
etc.).
Outline of a privacy protecting
plan/model
The following outline schema (see Figure 1) is pro-
posed to achieve these ends:
. A central identiﬁcation unit identiﬁes individuals
and issues patient cards (also provider and analyst
ID cards).
. Each patient card has a single master ID token
(viewable only by issuer and holder); the card holds
numerous secondary tokens, one of which is the
default patient records ID. The only link between
these ID/tokens exists at the level of the card itself,
and the card issuing unit.
. At the card issuing unit, the master patient ID is
linked with elements of context – for example name
and address, gender, enrolment/insurance plan,
biometric identiﬁers, contact details, ethnicity, reli-
gion. Appropriate arrangements must be made to
update those elements which are subject to change
(e.g. address, insurance plan, contacts).
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. Each provider ‘knows’ the patient in terms of the
data they have gathered about them (name, address,
date of birth, system registration number, insurer
and plan etc.); the patient is assigned an ID on the
provider system (unit record number) under which
the provider holds their copy of the medical record,
now linked to an ID token from the patient card.
. Whilst the patient will normally choose to use their
default ID in any encounter, theymay prefer to keep
certain encounters under another ID/token to main-
tain their separation.
. As well as choosing the ID/token under which an
event/encounter is to be stored, the patient can reveal
any of their alternate IDs at a consultation or en-
counter. Doing so enables the provider to access
additional care records held under these IDs (of
course only in conjunction with an authorised
provider ID card).
. The provider uploads to the central records reposi-
tory the summary/content of the encounter only,
and this record is associated with the ID/token
selected by the patient and an event identiﬁer code.
(If the patient has no functional ID card for what-
ever reason, this upload cannot take place.) The
event identiﬁer is copied to the patient card.
. The patient can change their ID attached to any
speciﬁc stored record of a care event/encounter to an
alternate ID from their assigned group, so changing
which patient ID that record will be displayed under:
groupings of events under each IDmay be stored on
the card and/or on a central server.
. The patient can leave a time-limited token on the
provider system allowing continuing access to past
as well as any additional records created under any
of their IDs shared with that provider until the
expiry of the token.
. Secondary users and data analysts submit their data
requirements to a central data abstraction service,
which abstracts the requisite records for the pur-
poses, linking together events recorded under dif-
ferent IDs for the same patient.
. For each approved analytic/research activity, the
abstraction service provides secondary users with
suﬃcient data by way of patient context ‘classiﬁ-
cation’ (e.g. age range, sex, region of domicile etc.)
to support the activity, but aiming to keep the
identity of the patient conﬁdential.
. The identiﬁcation unit will receive requests where
a ‘break-in’ to personal records for a patient is
deemed necessary (e.g. care emergencies). Approval
Figure 1 Outline of the privacy protection schema
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of such a request will enable the provider to access
the relevant records andwill at the same time trigger
an audit process. Part of the audit process is that the
patient and an independent auditor are informed of
the access and reasons for it as well as any other
relevant circumstances.
. For billing and insurance (public or private) pur-
poses, the insurer will receive data about care events
in two parts, linked by the event identiﬁer code.One
part will provide suﬃcient data for clinical audit and
determination of whether the billed items of service
were appropriate in the clinical circumstances, but
without the identity of the patient; when this has
been reviewed, the second part is passed to admin-
istration for settlement, identifying the patient,
provider and the approved items of service being
claimed, but without further clinical detail. Clearly
there can be some degree of loss of privacy involved,
but this is inevitable if the parties to the insurance
contract are to be able to fulﬁl their contractual
responsibilities.
Discussion
The central element of this plan is the patient health
card. Individuals already hold numerous cards (tokens)
used mainly to authenticate their identity in accessing
services (e.g. cash/credit, clubmemberships etc.). This
card diﬀers in that it does not actually identify the
individual, but securely identiﬁes and tracks their care
encounters grouped under several alternate tokens. It
also provides the key whereby providers can view
events that are otherwise hidden from them. The card
gives the patient control over who sees what of their
care records: however, where the patient is unable to
exercise that control (and no proxy has been ident-
iﬁed) the system allows for emergency access to the
records, at the same time triggering an audit process
relating to that override.
Patients can give their care providers a single use or
long-term token to access those of their records that
they choose to share. Patients may be using several
‘records identities’ and may move records between
identities if they choose: all these identities are linked
together at the level of the patient’s card aswell as at the
central identiﬁcation service. However, at the simplest
level the ‘default’ status would be that the principal
records’ identity is applied to all care encounters, and
that the care provider is given a long duration records
viewing token to store locally.
Patients’ identities cannot readily be discovered by
analysts or researchers, and even their insurers will
normally only have access to the minimum of clinical
detail in the personalised part of their claims. It
remains possible, although technically very diﬃcult,
for analysts to re-identify a small number of individuals
either from the combination of clinical and contextual
items provided with data for analysis, or by matching
data to other information known about a speciﬁc
target: to prevent this would be to render the second-
ary usage data largely useless. Naturally central ID unit
and data abstraction technical staﬀ can open any
records, but in doing so they will trigger the audit/
monitoring function.
If a patient loses an ID card, a replica can be provided
by the central identiﬁcation service where all identity
tokens are stored: the lost card remains secured by its
accession code (PIN), and can be invalidated on the
system. All data accesses to personal records will be
The New Zealand Health Information Service (NZHIS)13
Essentially the same goals, issues and challenges as are currently being addressed by theConnecting for Health
project were confronted by New Zealand in 1991. From the outset privacy was identiﬁed as being of the
highest concern and sensitivity. After two years of development, the NZHIS successfully went live in 1993
(subject to the provisions of the New Zealand Privacy Act, 1993) and has been embraced by public and
professionals. The system has an online patient master index (National Health Index, NHI) and online
medical warnings system which holds data for each individual on life-threatening conditions and life-
sustaining treatments. Care events (all secondary and selected primary events) are reported with aminimum
data set submitted by providers. Event reports have personal identiﬁers removed and are submitted
associated with a cipher, but the cipher is in fact the encrypted NHI number for that individual. The
encrypted cipher is subsequently re-encrypted at the database access layer to maintain anonymity even from
analysts. The Health Minister holds a ‘key-in-escrow’ that can be used to decrypt identities if there is a
suﬃciently pressing reason (e.g. incipient failure of an implanted device). All accesses and usages of the
system can be traced to a single legally accountable user and are audit trailed with full rollback capabilities.
The service falls under the oversight of the New Zealand Privacy Commissioner. Personal health smart cards
were debated but not implemented at the time due to their technical limitations: these limitations have now
almost completely been resolved.
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attributable to an identiﬁable individual, and a list of
those who have accessed which events in their records
can be provided to patients on demand.
Primary users of the records (care providers) will
have access to whatever records are held locally as well
as those available in the central store facility that are
approved by the patient. In an emergency where the
patient card has been lost or the patient is unable to
provide the PIN, the central identiﬁcation issuing service
can provide access to the patient records subject to
certain criteria being fulﬁlled. Emergency access trig-
gers an automatic audit trail informing both an
auditor and the patient. Providers will no longer be
able to access records of care for which they do not
hold the requisite patient token.Where a group practice
operates (e.g. a hospital clinic or general practice) and
personalised records and patient tokens are locally held
(with patient consent), other providers in the group
may be permitted to access these to support patient
care subject to local access control and auditmeasures.
Secondary users of health records can have access to
full clinical details of care encounters, but will always
be restricted in terms of the context that can be asso-
ciatedwith these. Selected characteristics derived from
the patient details can be made available (e.g. age
range, sex etc.) to support analyses, and all the records
pertaining to the same individual (irrespective of which
identiﬁer token they were stored under) can be linked
together for longitudinal studies. In the event that
personally identiﬁed data is required, for example in
studies of familial genetics, it will be imperative that
the permission of the patients is obtained to support
such research.
Conclusion
There is a signiﬁcant risk at the present time that the
NHS Connecting for Health initiative could become
derailed or deﬂected as a result of failing to deal
properly with the crucial issue of personal privacy
protection: this is the one issue that could stop the
entire program from progressing, to the detriment of
all.
It would seem that the security framework sur-
rounding current plans for the development of NHS
integrated centralised care records is probably in
contravention of the EU Directive and/or the Human
Rights Act.Where patients have shared their informa-
tion for a speciﬁc purpose (most often for diagnosis
and treatment, but this may include research if per-
mission is requested) it is their legal right to ensure
those are the sole purposes for which it is used whilst
it remains personalised – unless one of the statutory
exceptions applies, and this exception is deemed
consistent with their human rights. Current plans do
not appear to sustain these requirements: it might be
diﬀerent if there were no other way to provide for the
primary and secondary data uses within the principles
of the EU Directive and the Human Rights Act, but
this is not the case, and an alternative has been out-
lined in this paper.
Unless these issues are fully and openly addressed,
there will be rumbling discontent, important records
will be withheld and attempts to discredit the system
will continue, with various players taking combative
political positions.14 Public conﬁdence is already suf-
fering and will inevitably deteriorate further. Every
apparent breach of personal privacy will lead to (most
probably successful) legal challenges and the system
will become mired in political and legal controversy
and discredited, consequently suﬀering from data
degradation and disuse.
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